Abstract
Introduction
It is widely observed that within industries or economic sectors some firms systematically outperform their competitors. Wal-Mart in retail, Dell in PCs, IBM in computers and IT services, Microsoft in software, UPS and Federal Express in shipping, Goldman Sachs in investment banking, Southwest among airlines, and similarly in practically every industry. Such supernormal performance, generally manifested by sustained growth in sales, earnings, and market value, is not attributed to monopoly power or competition-constraining regulation, but rather to the organization of the leading enterprise. Such organization is manifested by unique systems and processes employed in the investment, production, and sales activities of the enterprise, along with the incentives and compensation systems governing its human resources. This collective resource, often dubbed "organization capital," is the major factor of production that is unique to the firm and thus capable of yielding abnormal-above cost of capital-returns, thereby generating enterprise growth. Most other factors of production, labor and capital in particular, are commodities in the modern economy, since competitors have equal access to them, and therefore yield, at best, the cost of capital.
1 Organization capital, in contrast, is the persistent creator of value and growth for business enterprises.
It is easy to conjure examples of specific business processes and designs that make up organization capital, and even to conceptualize intuitively this resource as an extra, unmeasured factor of production responsible for abnormal firm performance. However, there exist no 1 Even R&D yields, on average, the cost of capital. Chan, Lakonishok, and Sougiannis (2001) report that the performance of firms conducting R&D is not superior, on average, to that of firms without R&D. See also Hall (1993) for similar results. 2 Examples of specific business processes and designs that are components of organization capital are WalMart's supply chain, where the reading of the barcodes of purchased products at the checkout register is directly transmitted to suppliers who are in turn largely responsible for inventory management; Cisco's operational measures of organization capital. Such measures will be highly useful to a multitude of decision makers. Managers obviously need to track the size and growth of organization capital-the major source of competitive advantage-and benchmark it against the past (is our organization capital deteriorating?) and against rivals. Furthermore, valuing organization capital will enable managers to assess the return on investments in creating this resource, such as information technology (IT) and brand enhancement. Specifically, relating IT expenditures or brand enhancement outlays to changes in organizational capital will indicate the returns on these investments and guide overall resource allocation (invest less or more in IT?). Investors will similarly be eager to incorporate the value of organization capital in their corporate valuation models. In merger and acquisition cases, the value of organization capital should play a prominent role, since, as will be argued below, such capital is predominately tacit and difficult to transfer across firms, and hence of questionable value in acquisitions. Economic, organization, and management researchers, in search of quantifying the elusive concept of "quality of management" will find an operational measure of organization capital highly instructive, since this capital essentially reflects the sum total of managerial decisions and activities.
In this study, we develop a firm-specific measure of organization capital and estimate it for a large sample of publicly traded companies. We test the validity of our measure within a widely used investment valuation model and show that it contributes significantly to the explanation of differences in market values of firms, beyond the traditional value indicators of assets in place and expected abnormal earnings (growth potential). We also document that financial analysts, the major information intermediaries in capital markets, fail to fully comprehend the value of firms' organization capital, probably because of the absence of relevant
Internet-based product installation and maintenance system, estimated by Cisco's CFO to have saved $1.5 billion over three years (Economist, June 26, 1999, p. 12) ; and Dell's pioneering built-to-order distribution system, where customers design their products.
information on this resource in corporate financial reports (e.g., no data on IT expenditures, employee training, brand enhancement activities, etc.).
Section 2 of the paper discusses various concepts of organization capital and related research, while Section 3 presents our methodology for measuring firm-specific organization capital and the empirical estimates. Section 4 examines the association between information technology-a key driver of organization capital-and our estimates of this resource; Section 5
incorporates estimates of organization capital in a widely used valuation model to validate their usefulness, while Section 6 concludes the paper.
What exactly is organization capital?
A succinct definition of organization capital was provided by Evenson and Westphal (1995, p. communities of practice to share information among employees, as well as decision and legal procedures for appropriating maximal benefits from intellectual property (e.g., patent licensing and technology turf protection). Organization capital is thus an agglomeration of technologiesbusiness practices, processes and designs, and incentive and compensation systems-that together enable some firms to consistently and efficiently extract from a given level of physical and human resources a higher value of product than other firms find possible to attain. 4 Some researchers on organization capital view this resource as embodied in employees (e.g., Jovanovic, 1979; Becker, 1993) . Elaborating on this view, Prescott and Visscher (1980, pp. 447-448) include the following factors in organization capital: (a) "what the firm knows about the abilities of its personnel…improving matches between employees and jobs by measuring performance…," (b) what "the firm learns about its employees to improve the match between employees working in teams," and (c) "the human capital of the firm's employees." Others view organization capital beyond that embedded in people, defining it as "a firm-specific capital good jointly produced with output and embodied in the organization itself." (Atkeson and Kehoe, 2002, p. 3) . Proponents of this approach include Arrow (1962) , Rosen (1972) , Tomer (1987) , and Ericson and Pakes (1995) . In the present study, we follow the latter-firm-embodied-concept of organization capital.
The competitive advantages conferred on firms by organization capital are mainly due to the fact that this resource cannot be completely codified and hence transferred to other organizations or imitated by them. As Evenson and Westphal (1995, p. 2213) note: "Much of the knowledge about how to perform elementary processes and about how to combine them in efficient systems is tacit, not physically embodied and neither codified nor readily transferable. 4 Sometimes the absence of organization capital is mentioned as a potential source of future value: In an interview with Bill Miller (Barron's, February 3, 2003, p. 26) , this most successful fund manager (an average annual return of 14.5% over the past 10 years) said the following about Home Depot: "People are talking about its problems…but all these problems are getting fixed. This is a company that didn't have any perpetual inventory, didn't have any point-of-sales terminals, didn't have pay scales for their Thus, though two producers in the same circumstances may use identical material inputs in conjunction with equal information, they may nonetheless employ what are really two distinct techniques owing to differences in understanding of the tacit elements." The car industry exemplifies the difficulties in imitating and adopting others' organization capital: With all that has been written about Japanese car manufacturers' efficiency systems (e.g., just-in-time production process), and the vast efforts to imitate these systems by competitors over the last two decades (including joint Japanese-U.S. production facilities, such as the GM-Toyota Nummi plant in Freemont, California), Japanese car manufacturers are still the world leaders in efficiency, profitability, and quality. 5 Clearly, the essential elements of organization capital are not transferable across firms, even over extended time periods.
The partial tacitness of organization capital is among the major reasons this resource is hard to measure, both at the input and output levels. Part of the investment (input) in organization capital is not fully tracked by firms. For example, the cost of on-the-job training, particularly the mentoring of young employees by senior ones, is generally not recorded by the accounting system. Also not recorded as an investment are the extensive efforts of employees to better educate themselves and improve the efficiency of firms' production, research, and selling processes (the "suggestions box," for example). In general, the smaller the enterprise the less likely that the accounting system will systematically track and record all the investment in organization capital. Consequently, firms and investors lack reliable input (cost) measures of organization capital. Nor is the output of organization capital easy to quantify. Such outputbusiness designs and processes, for example-is essentially an intermediate product without a market price (see Aghion and Howitt, 1998, Ch. 12 
Estimating organization capital Methodology
We model the firm's output, or sales (denoted by SALE), as a function of its major inputs: physical capital (PPE: property, plant, and equipment), labor (EMP: number of employees), and R&D capital (RND), where RND represents the firm's innovative activities, that is, its intangible assets. The following function, which assumes constant returns to scale (as in Hall, 2000) , is used to estimate organization capital:
where SALE it is the revenue of firm i in year t, a 0it stands for organization capital, PPE it is the net value of plant, property, and equipment, EMP it is the number employees, RND it is the firm's research and development capital (the latter three variables are valued at year-end), and e it is an error term. 6 It is possible to estimate organization capital from the residual of expression (1), either by extracting the systematic component of e it , or by inserting firm-specific dummy variables in (1).
This approach was followed in the early attempts to estimate "total factor productivity" (TFP) in macroeconomic growth models (Solow, 1957 6 Note that the physical (PPE) and intangible (RND) inputs in (1) are measured in monetary values, whereas labor (EMP) is measured by the number of employees. This is due to the absence of a reliable, publicly reported monetary measure of firm-specific human capital. This is, in fact, an advantage, since the presence of the number of employees in (1) shifts the value of organization capital embedded in employees (particular skills and incentives) to the estimate of the firm's organization capital, a 0it , where it belongs. 7 In the basic growth model, the growth rate of GDP is related to capital, labor, and a residual, generally believed to reflect the economy's technology or innovation capabilities. 8 A recent McKinsey (2002) on a study of the performance of 1000 companies during an 18 year period spanning 1982 to 1999 concludes that leaders tend to expand their selling, general and administrative costs significantly above average during recessions as well as increase their research and development spending. That is, successful companies switch to an attack mode during bad times, because competition is weakened, and do this partially by expenditures reflected in the item selling, general and administrative expenses. This is an example of building organization capital that helps companies perform better than average consistently.
advertising expenses, sales incentives, expenditures to support global and domestic affiliates, and expenditures on logistics of distribution systems (direct-store-delivery systems) . Obviously, such brand enhancement and organization design outlays/investments are aimed at enhancing PepsiCo's organization capital. To be sure, not all of the firm's SGA expenses enhance organization capital-PepsiCo's SGA includes executives' compensation, for example -but it is reasonable to assume that most of the expenditures aimed at creating and enhancing organization capital are included in the firm's SGA expenses.
Specifically, we model the organization capital variable in (1), a 0it , as follows:
where SGA is the firm's sales, general, and administrative expenses in year t. We allow for two types of organization capital: (a) an economy-wide, common organization capital, (b 0t ), which is available to all firms (e.g., a certain level of population education, the prevailing legal and institutional setting, etc.), and (b) a firm-specific organization capital (b 0st log(SGA it )), which is developed and maintained by each firm (e.g., coded knowledge, production blueprints, business processes and procedures, marketing networks and channels, etc.).
SGA is determined by: (a) the level of the firm's activity, as captured by its output (SALE), and (b) the committed portion of expenditures (e.g., multi-year employee training programs), captured by the lagged value of SGA. The level of output affects SGA because as the level of activity increases its business processes and practices need to be scaled-up to accommodate the delivery of products and services for the larger base of customers. The committed portion of SGA reflects the adjustment costs involved in making changes in business processes and practices which are not instantaneous. To accommodate the endogeneity of it we model SGA as follows:
We estimate expressions (1) and (3) by taking logarithms of annual changes, after substituting expression (2) into (1):
We estimate expressions (4) and (5) using the two-stage-least-squares procedure cross-sectionally for each sample year , for all firms listed on the Compustat database that operate in 12 major industry categories, and that have the required financial data (see Appendix A for the industry classification).
(R&D) over five years (a 20% annual amortization rate), 10 and we set the R&D expense to zero when data were not available on Compustat. We generate our estimates for each sample year for two groups of firms-those with R&D expenditures and those without R&D expenditures-to investigate differences in organization capital between firms that formally invest in R&D and those that do not. The sample contains 57,258 (non-R&D), and 32,979 (R&D) firm-year observations, spanning the period 1978-2002.
Panel A of Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of the variables in expressions (4) and (5) (4) for the R&D and non-R&D firms. It is evident from Panel A that, at the mean, R&D firms are larger than non-R&D ones, although at the median the reverse is true. This indicates the presence in the sample of some very large R&D firms (e.g., General Electric, Microsoft, Pfizer). 11 Panel B indicates that, for both R&D and non-R&D firms, the logarithm of growth in the common, economy-wide organization capital (i.e., the intercept) is 0.03, which represents approximately 3% of average output growth. This is consistent with the aggregate Divisia index estimates in Hall (2000) . For the R&D (non-R&D) firms, the marginal productivity of plant, property, and equipment (b 1 * in expression (3)) is 0.08 (0.10), the marginal productivity of human capital (b 2 * ) is 0.33 (0.15), and the marginal productivity of research and development (b 3 * ) is 0.09 (where the asterisk indicates the mean coefficient estimate across all years and industries). The difference between the marginal productivities of PPE for the subsamples of R&D and non-R&D firms is not significant at the P < 0.01 percent level, suggesting that R&D does not appreciably affect the marginal productivity of physical assets. In contrast, the difference between the marginal productivities of employees (EMP) across the R&D and non-R&D subsamples is statistically significant at the P < 0.01 level, suggesting that R&D enhances the efficiency of employees, apparently through process R&D. The marginal productivity of SGA (b 0s * ), our proxy for organization capital, is 0.41 and 0.58, for R&D and non-R&D firms, respectively; where the difference in the marginal productivities is significant at the P < 0.01 level. This suggests that non-R&D firms sustain their competitive edge through organizational processes and designs, generated by SGA expenditures, to compensate for the absence of R&D.
Deriving Firm-Specific Estimates
We now derive firm-specific estimates of the annual contribution of organization capital to output growth by transforming the coefficient estimates of expression (4) into monetary values.
Specifically, we define two expectations of firm's output (sales) from expression (4): the expected output of firm i in year t with and without the common and firm-specific organization capital, estimated by the proxy SGA. 12 From expression (4), the expected output of firm i in year t with organization capital is as follows:
Where b nt * for n = 0, 0S (S for specific organization capital), 1, 2, 3 are the coefficient estimates obtained from the annual cross-sectional estimation of expression (3) for each industry described above.
The expected output of firm i in year t without the effect of organization capital is as follows:
Given the two output expectations, expressions (6) and (7), our firm-specific measure of organization capital (OC) is the difference between expected sales with and without organization capital:
where SALE it * and SALE it ** are defined by (6) and (7), respectively. 13 Note that the annual estimate of OC (8) is not the total value of the firm's organization capital, but is rather the annual contribution of organization capital to output growth. (5), from the firm's actual sales (SALE it ), rather than from expected sales with OC (expression (4)). The drawback of such an estimate is that the consequent OC measure includes the noise in the regression residual, whereas our estimate (6) 
Firm-specific examples
To provide intuition and insight into our organization capital measure, Table 2 Table 2 ): Columns B and D provide for each year the log of predicted sales growth, with and without organization capital, respectively; that is, using expressions (6) and (7) Therefore, for a subsample of firms, we obtained annual data on firm-specific IT expenditures 17 Early in the ongoing debate about IT's contribution to productivity and growth, Robert Solow commented: "I see IT everywhere, except in the productivity data," (Gordon 2000) . Subsequent studies (e.g., Gordon and Baily, 1993) recorded substantial IT contribution, but only in a few industries, particularly computers and software. Others (e.g., Brynjolffson and Hitt, 1996) reported a substantial, widespread contribution.
from Information Week reports published in its IT 500 survey. 18 To quantify the association between organization capital and IT expenditures, we estimate the following regression:
where OC it is firm's i organization capital contribution in year t (1991-1997), IT it is firm i's information technology expenditures in year t, and MKS it is firm i's market share in year t, measured as the percentage of firm i's sales relative to the total sales of all the firms in its industry group (see Appendix A). We incorporate the market share indicator in expression (9) as a control variable. Firms with effective organization capital will capture significant market share.
Thus, the presence of the firm's market share in (9) controls for certain missing variables that affect organization capital, thereby allowing us to focus on the unique contribution of IT to OC.
We use the information technology expenditures in the preceding year (IT i,t-1 ) to assess whether spending on information technology contributes to OC in a sustained fashion.
We also estimate expression (10), which is a variant of expression (9), by using the preceding year's IT expenditures as well as the current year's change in IT expenditures over the preceding year.
where are all variables are defined as in expression (9). 19 We do not include the current value of information technology expenditure in expression (9) because IT it and IT i(t-1) are highly correlated (see Table 3 , Panel B).
minimum of $1 million and a maximum of $4.3 billion. Thus, the sample includes a cross-section of companies that span a broad range of IT expenditures. Similarly, the mean (median) MKS is 5.8% (2.8%), with a minimum of 0.006% and a maximum of 75%, indicating that the sample includes a cross-section of companies vis-à-vis market share. Table 3 This provides initial evidence that IT spending is associated with building organization capital. Table 3 , Panel C, provides estimates of expressions (9) and (10). The coefficient of market share (MKS) is, as expected, positive and highly significant. The coefficients of both the prior year's IT expenditures and the current year's change in IT expenditures are positive and highly significant, indicating that information technology is a major contributor to organization capital, as captured by our measure. Table 3 , Panel D, provides the estimates of expressions (9) and (10) when the sample is partitioned into companies with yearly high, medium, and low market-to-book values. The market-to-book ratio, namely the ratio of the firm's value in the capital market to its value on the balance sheet, the latter reflecting primarily physical and financial assets, conveys investors' assessment of the firm's assets which are missing from its balance sheet (primarily intangible assets). Accordingly, high market-to-book value companies are intangible-intensive-that is, rich in organization capital. The estimates of expressions (9) and (10) in Panel D indeed show that IT expenditures are much more strongly associated with organization capital-higher values of the IT regression coefficients-for the group with high market-to-book ratios, than for those with low market-to-book ratios, providing additional validity for our measure of organization capital.
Organization capital and equity valuation
Having developed an estimate of organization capital, we now examine its validity by incorporating the measure in a widely used equity (stock) valuation model. This model (Preinreich, 1938; Ohlson, 1995) , relates the firm's stock price to its assets-in-place (property, plant, inventory, etc., minus liabilities) plus its growth potential, which is measured by the firm's future abnormal earnings. These are the earnings in excess of the required rate of return on assets (cost of capital). This model thus relates the value of the firm to its existing assets plus the future abnormal earning, or growth potential, expected from these assets:
where, V it is firm i's market value at the end of year t, BV it is its book value (balance sheet value of assets minus liabilities) at the end of year t, representing assets-in-place, and RE it is firm i's present value of abnormal earnings at the end of year t (growth potential). The right-hand rearrangement of expression (11) shows that the difference between market value and the value of assets-in-place is equal to the present value of abnormal earnings.
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Section 2 mentions organization capital as an unmeasured resource, since it is not reflected in firms' balance sheets and is therefore absent from BV in (11). Hence, if our measure of organization capital captures important elements of the firm's future abnormal earnings potential, then it should be associated with the difference between the market and the book value of equity (expression 11). Accordingly, our first validation test of the measure of organization capital is to estimate the following regression:
where MV it is firm i's market value of equity three months after the end of fiscal year t, BV it is firm i's book value of equity at the end of year t, OC it is the firm's contribution of organization capital to sales (expression 8), and SALE it is the sales of firm i in fiscal year t. 21 We scale (deflate) all the variables by SALE to control for size effects. that OC by itself explains a quarter of the cross-sectional variation in the difference between market and book values of equity. This suggests that OC is strongly related to the firm's capacity to generate future abnormal earnings, or growth. The coefficient on OC is 2.26, indicating that the contribution of organization capital in a given year to the present value of future abnormal earnings lasts for about three years, using a discount rate of 12% (i.e., than a ratio. The gap between market and book value, representing investment opportunities in the Q theory, is manifested in expression (11) by RE it , the present value of abnormal earnings. 21 The market value of firm i, MV it , is measured three months after the end of the year to allow stock prices to reflect the financial results of year t, which have to be publicly disclosed during 90 days after the end of the year. 22 See Brown, Lo, and Lys (1999) for the appropriateness of using sales as the scaling variable.
{1/(1.12)}+{1/(1.12) 2 }+{1/(1.12) 3 }=2.40). This is consistent with the observation in the Xerox example ( Figure 1 ) that OC leads the stock price by about two years. (12) for the high, medium, and low market-to-book value of equity subsamples. As noted in Section 4, companies with high marketto-book values are more intangible-intensive and, hence, the contribution of OC to future abnormal earnings should be greater. The estimates are consistent with this notion: For the high market-to-book firms, the coefficient on OC is 4.67, which suggests that the contribution of organization capital to future abnormal earnings lasts for about five years, using a discount rate of 12%; whereas, for the medium market-to-book firms, the OC contribution to future abnormal earnings lasts for about two years (and less than a year for low-market-to-book firms). We thus conclude that our measure of organization capital captures a major component of the firm's intangibles assets, or growth potential, as reflected by the gap between the market and book (accounting) values of public companies.
Since organization capital is a major contributor to future earnings, and, hence, OC will be partially or fully subsumed by the present value of abnormal earnings (RE), we omitted RE it from the regression in expression (12). We now introduce a widely used proxy for future earnings-financial analysts' forecasts of earnings-into the valuation model. 23 In essence, we wish to test the extent to which financial analysts, the major information intermediaries in capital markets, comprehend the value and profit implications of organization capital in their analyses and consequent earnings forecasts.
Accordingly, we compute the present value of the firm's abnormal earnings as the sum of two components: the present value of abnormal earnings in the next five years, based on explicit 23 Commercially available forecasts of future earnings are provided by various sources for most public companies for one, two, and sometimes three years out, as well as long term (five years out) growth rates of earnings. We obtained analysts' consensus (mean) earnings forecasts (for multiple forecasts per firm) and long-term growth estimates from I/B/E/S (First Call).
analysts' forecasts of annual earnings, plus the present value of abnormal earnings from year 6 to infinity. The overall present value of abnormal earnings is defined thus:
where FE ikt is the consensus analysts' earnings forecast for firm i, k years ahead, made four months after the end of fiscal year t (to allow financial analysts access to the annual report of year t); r it is the discount rate; applied to future earnings; BV it is the book value (net assets) of firm i at
DIV it is the dividend the firm paid in year t;
and g it is the growth rate of abnormal earnings in year 6 [FE i6t -r it BV i5t ]. 24 Thus, residual earnings for each future year-the difference between analysts' earnings forecast for that year (FE) and a charge for the cost of equity (rBV)-are predicted for each company for the next five years, followed by a terminal value, based on a constant growth expression. We estimate firm-specific discount rate, r it , using the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) with a beta (systematic risk)
indicator estimated in a conventional fashion (regressing the firm's monthly stock returns on the market return), using returns from the preceding 60 months. The discount rate is then set equal to the 12-month Treasury bill rate (the riskless rate) plus the estimated beta multiplied by an equity risk premium of 5.5%.
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To examine the extent to which financial analysts incorporate elements of the organization capital estimate, OC, into their future earnings forecasts, we estimate the following two expressions:
24
The growth rate from year five on, g it , is set equal to r it minus 3%, if g it > (r it -0.03). We used the current dividend payout ratio (dividends to earnings) to estimate expected dividends and winsorized the dividend payout ratio at 10% if the current dividend payout ratio exceeded 10%. 25 We obtain similar results when using a constant discount rate of either 10% or 12% for all firms.
and [(MV
where all variables retain their previous definitions. Expression (15) provides the estimation of the valuation model without organization capital, OC, whereas expression (14) includes the organization capital. If analysts fully incorporate the contribution of organization capital to future earnings in their earnings forecasts, then OC will be subsumed in RE, and the coefficient on OC in (14) will be zero. Conversely, if analysts do not fully incorporate the effect of organization capital in their earnings forecasts, the coefficient on OC (b 1 ) will be positive, and the explanatory power of expression (14) will be higher than that of expression (15). In this manner, we assess analysts' ability to value firms' organization capital. (14) and (15), indicating that the addition of organization capital (OC) to the valuation expression (14) substantially improves the explanatory power: from 24% (adjusted R 2 of expression (15)) to 32% (adjusted R 2 of expression (14)). The coefficient estimate on the flow variable OC is 2.02, and is highly statistically significant, indicating that financial analysts fail to capture a major asset (organization capital) that contributes to future profitability. Table 4 , Panel E, provides estimates of expressions (14) and (15) when the sample is partitioned into three groups of firms ranked by market-to-book value of equity. For all partitions, the OC measure improves the explanatory power of the gap between market and book values.
However, OC provides the largest improvement in explanatory power for the medium and high market-to-book groups: the adjusted R 2 of expression (14) is 52% (medium) and 55% (high) versus 22% and 32% for expression (15), respectively. This suggests that financial analysts, the highly influential information intermediaries in capital markets, fail to fully comprehend the value and impact of organization capital, and that this failure is particularly acute for high-growth (high market-to-book) firms.
The adjusted-R 2 measures of the yearly estimates of expressions (14) and (15) 
Concluding Remarks
Organization capital is the major idiosyncratic resource that affects performance and growth of firms. However, this resource is not measured internally by companies, nor is it reported to capital markets. In this study, we develop a firm-specific measure of organization capital and estimate it for a large sample of publicly traded companies. To validate our measure, we examine the association between information technology expenditures and organization capital and find that IT is highly associated with organization capital. We then test the validity of our measure within a widely used investment valuation model and show that it contributes significantly to the explanation of market values of firms, beyond the traditional indicators of assets in place (book value) and expected abnormal earnings (growth potential). We also document that financial analysts, the major information intermediaries in capital markets, fail to fully comprehend the value of firms' organization capital, probably because of the absence of relevant information on this resource in corporate financial reports (e.g., no data on IT expenditures, employee training, brand enhancement activities, etc. -2519, 2590-2599, 3630-3659, 3710-3711, 3714-3714, 3716-3716, 3750-3751, 3792-3792, 3900-3939, 3990-3999 2520-2589, 2600-2699, 2750-2769, 3000-3099, 3200-3569, 3580-3629, 3700-3709, 3712-3713, 3715-3715, 3717-3749, 3752-3791, 3793-3799, 3830-3839, 3860-3899 (4) and (5) are estimated annually for each of the 12 industry groups defined in Appendix A using the two-stage-least-squares procedure. 3. Panels C and D provide estimates of the mean coefficient and the associated t-statistics of the 300 regressions, one for each of the 25 years and 12 industry groups in each year. 4. The sample contains 57,258 (non-RND) and 32,979 (RND) firm-estimation year panels, spanning . Variable Definitions SALE is the net revenues; PPE is the plant, property, and equipment net of depreciation; EMP is the number of employees; RND is the research and development capital computed by capitalizing and amortizing R&D expenditures over five years; SGA is the selling, general, and administrative expenses. (4) and (5) are estimated annually for each of the 12 industry groups defined in Appendix A using the two-stage-least-squares procedure. 
Notes:
1. The numbers in Panel B are the Spearman rank correlation coefficients. 2. The low, medium, and high market-to-book value of equity groups contain the bottom, middle, and top onethird of the observations sorted each year based on the market-to-book values of equity, respectively. 3. The Information Week sample contains 1,818 firm-years, spanning 1991-1997. Variable Definitions OC it is the abnormal output computed as the predicted value of sales obtained by estimating expression (4) and the predicted value of sales with asset productivities alone in estimates of expression (4), i.e., expression (8). MKS it is the percentage of market share of firm i in year t computed for the 12 industry groups, MKS imt = SALE imt /Σ j SALE jmt where firm i belongs to the industry group m and the sum of sales is over all firms in the industry group m. IT it is the information technology expenditure of firm i in year t as reported in the Information Week 500 survey. 32.56%
1. The t-statistic is the White's heteroskedasticity adjusted t-statistic. 2. The low, medium, and high market-to-book value of equity groups contain the bottom, middle, and top one-third of the observations sorted each year based on the market-to-book values of equity, respectively. 3. The sample contains 44,073 firm-year observations spanning . Variable Definitions MV is the market value four months subsequent to the fiscal year-end; BV is the stockholders' equity; the discount rate (r) is computed as beta times risk premium of 5.5% plus the twelve-month treasury bill rate. The beta value is obtained from CAPM using the monthly returns for firm i from year (t -5) to (t -1). RE is the sum over five years of the discounted abnormal earnings plus a terminal value. Specifically, RE it = Σ k=1,5 -5 , where g it is the growth in [FE i6t -r it BV i5t ]. FE ikt is the consensus analysts' earnings forecast k years ahead for firm i, four months after the fiscal year t; V it is the value of equity computed as the sum of RE it and BV it ; OC it is the abnormal output computed as the predicted value of sales obtained by estimating expression (4) and the predicted value of sales with asset productivities alone in expression (4) estimates, i.e., expression (8).
